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Shared Indigenous and Crown Sovereignty: Modifying the State Model
© Kent McNeil,* Osgoode Hall Law School, November 2020

Abstract: When European nations colonized North America, their dealings with one another
were based on the state model of territorial sovereignty. At the same time, they acknowledged
the independence of the Indigenous nations and entered into nation-to-nation treaties with them,
whereby sovereignty was to be shared. Consequently, the Westphalian concept of absolute state
sovereignty has never applied in North America. While the European nations acquired
sovereignty vis-à-vis one another in the international law system that they created, the
Indigenous nations retained internal sovereignty and the right to continue governing themselves.
This modified concept of state sovereignty has been acknowledged by the United States Supreme
Court since the 1820s and is gradually being accepted in Canada. It is consistent with, and even
required by, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in particular
that document’s affirmation of the right of Indigenous peoples to self-determination and their
right to internal self-government.
Text
The concept of sovereignty as we know it developed in Europe in the medieval period as the
universalist claims to political authority of the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor were
challenged by the rulers of emerging nation-states and as the fragmented jurisdiction that
characterized feudalism was replaced by more centralized authority. 1 This new system of
independent states that had been developing since at least the 12th century was formally
acknowledged by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.2 As theorized by Jean Bodin in Six Bookes of
a Commonweale,3 published in 1576, sovereigns came to be viewed as having complete political
authority within their territories and as being equal in their relations with one another. This
absolutist conception of sovereignty held sway up until the late twentieth century, when it began
to be weakened by, among other things, creation of the European Union and acceptance of the
Responsibility to Protect, whereby states have an obligation to intervene in the internal affairs of
other states that engage in genocide and other crimes against humanity.4
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Prior to European colonization, the Indigenous nations of North America were factually
independent. Although socially and politically organized in vastly different ways than European
states, they exercised jurisdictional control amounting to de facto sovereignty over their
territories and peoples. Their political independence was acknowledged by France and Britain in
particular, in part through the negotiation of treaties with them.5 At the same time, however, in
their relations with one another the European nations tended to act as though North America was
juridically vacant – terra nullius – insofar as territorial sovereignty was concerned.6 They made
preposterous claims to vast regions scarcely even explored by them on the basis of discovery,
papal grants, symbolic acts of possession, royal charters, and the like that did not take account of
the presence and control of the Indigenous nations.7 The Europeans thus adopted a two-faced
approach to colonization, acknowledging Indigenous sovereignty on the one hand and effectively
denying it on the other, depending on whether they were dealing with Indigenous nations or
fellow European nations.8 Eventually, of course, the European nations and their successors, the
United States, Mexico and Canada, were able to extend their de facto sovereignty over all of
North America. The European state system that became the basis for international law was
applied, as it has been in the World generally (apart from oceans, seas, and Antarctica).
What, then, happened to the Indigenous sovereignty that pre-dated this state system? Did
it disappear, or was it somehow taken into account and incorporated into the body politic of what
became the United States and Canada? As these questions were addressed earlier and more
explicitly in the United States, this paper begins with a discussion of how American
jurisprudence modified the Westphalian model to make space for continuing Indigenous
corporate power have also been weakening state sovereignty: e.g. see Joel Bakan, The New Corporation: How
“Good” Corporations Are Bad for Democracy (Allen Lane, 2020). On other factors undermining state authority, see
Creveld, supra note 1 at 336-414; James A. Caporaso, “Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public
Authority, and Sovereignty” (2000) 2:2 Int’l Stud. Rev. 1.
5
See W.J. Eccles, “Sovereignty-association, 1500-1783” (1984) 65:4 Can. Hist. Rev. 475; Cornelius J. Jaenen,
“French Sovereignty and Native Nationhood during the French Régime”, in J.R. Miller, ed., Sweet Promises: A
Reader on Indian-White Relations in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 19; Andrée Lajoie &
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Andrée Lajoie, Jean-Maurice Brisson, Sylvio Normand & Alain Bissonnette, eds., Le Statut Juridique des Peuples
Autochtones au Québec et le Pluralisme (Québec: Les Editions Yvon Blais, 1996), 161; Michael Asch, ed.,
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Rights in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014) [Asch, On Being Here to Stay].
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sovereignty. Turning to Canada, I suggest that an equivalent modification is beginning to take
place here, so a sharing of Indigenous and Crown sovereignty can be envisaged. International
support for this development is provided by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples that Canada has pledged to implement.
1. The United States
The United States Supreme Court addressed the matter of the political status of the Indian
nations or tribes (as they are still called in the US) in the 1820s and ’30s in three leading
judgments delivered by Chief Justice John Marshall. In Johnson v. M’Intosh,9 he dealt with the
validity of pre-American Revolution private purchases of Indian land north of the Ohio River
where the British Crown claimed sovereignty. He found the purchases could not be upheld in
American courts, mainly because the infamous doctrine of discovery, which he incorporated into
American law from what he wrongly supposed to be a principle of international law, 10 gave a
discovering European nation the sole power of acquiring lands from the Indian nations by
purchase or conquest.11 He also decided that the Royal Proclamation of 1763, issued by King
George III, prevented purchases of Indian lands other than by the British Crown. He nonetheless
thought that Indigenous sovereignty and land rights were only limited by British acquisition of
sovereignty – they were not extinguished:
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were in no
instance entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired.
They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just
claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their
rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and
their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was
denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those
who made it.12
But Marshall C.J. gave another reason for denying the enforceability of the private
purchases in American courts that is even more revealing of the extent to which the Indian
9

8 Wheat. (21 U.S.) 543 (1823).
Marshall C.J. thought all the colonizing European powers had agreed to this principle, but this was not the case:
see works cited in note 7 supra and L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (London: Longmans, Green,
1905), vol. 1, 265; M.F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law
(London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1926); Julius Goebel, Jr., The Struggle for the Falkland Islands: A Study in Legal
and Diplomatic History (1927, reissued Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1971), 47-119; Friedrich August
Freiherr von der Heydte, “Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in International Law” (1935)
29 Am. J. of Int’l L. 448.
11
For critiques, see David E. Wilkins & K. Tsianina Lomawaima, Uneven Ground: American Indian Sovereignty
and Federal Law (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), 19-63; Frank Pommersheim, Broken Landscape:
Indians, Indian Tribes, and the Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 88-115; Robert J. Miller,
et al., Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010); Kent McNeil, “The Doctrine of Discovery Reconsidered: Reflecting on Robert J Miller,
Jacinta Ruru, Larissa Behrendt, and Tracey Lindberg, Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in
the English Colonies and Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal Nations and Canada” (2016) 53:2
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 699-728.
12
Johnson v. M’Intosh, supra note 9 at 574 (emphasis added).
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nations retained aspects of their sovereignty. He said that purchases from those nations would be
subject to their laws and,
[a]dmitting their power to change their laws or usages, … if they choose to resume it
[the grant], and make a different disposition of the land, the Courts of the United States
cannot interpose for the protection of the title. The person who purchases lands from the
Indians, within their territory, incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the
property purchased; holds their title under their protection, and subject to their laws. If
they annul the grant, we know of no tribunal which can revise and set aside the
proceeding.13
When the nations in question subsequently signed treaties ceding the territory where the lands
were located to the United States, the earlier purchases were necessarily annulled. 14 It is
therefore apparent that Marshall C.J. thought the Indian nations retained not only their own laws,
but also the sovereign authority to alter those laws after British colonization.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,15 the second of the Marshall trilogy of Indian rights cases,
was brought by the Cherokee Nation in the Supreme Court, which has original jurisdiction to
decide cases in which a State is a party, including cases between “a State … and foreign
States”.16 The Cherokee Nation sought “an injunction to restrain the state of Georgia from the
execution of certain laws of that state, which, as is alleged, go directly to annihilate the
Cherokees as a political society, and to seize, for the use of Georgia, the lands of the nation
which have been assured to them by the United States in solemn treaties repeatedly made and
still in force.”17 For the Supreme Court to have jurisdiction, the Cherokee Nation therefore had
to be a “foreign State”. Marshall C.J. had no difficulty finding the Cherokee Nation to be a state:
So much of the argument as was intended to prove the character of the Cherokees as a
state, as a distinct political society, separated from others, capable of managing its own
affairs and governing itself, has, in the opinion of a majority of the judges, been
completely successful. They have been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement
of our country. The numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognize
them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, [and] of being
responsible in their political character for any violation of their engagements…. The acts
of our government plainly recognize the Cherokee Nation as a state, and the courts are
bound by those acts.18
A more difficult question was whether the Cherokee Nation is a foreign State. Noting the
unique position of the Cherokees, Marshall C.J. observed that “[t]he condition of the Indians in
relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two peoples in existence.” 19
13

Ibid. at 593 (emphasis added).
Ibid. at 593-94.
15
5 Pet. (30 U.S.) 1 (1831) [Cherokee Nation].
16
Constitution of the United States, Art. III, s.2(1)-(2).
17
Cherokee Nation, supra note 15 at 15.
18
Ibid. at 16.
19
Ibid.
14
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While acknowledging that the Cherokees are aliens who do not owe allegiance to the United
States,20 he said that the “Indian territory is admitted to compose part of the United States.” 21 He
continued:
In all our intercourse with foreign nations, in our commercial regulations, in any attempt
at intercourse between Indians and foreign nations, they are considered as within the
jurisdictional limits of the United States, subject to many of those restraints which are
imposed upon our own citizens. They acknowledge themselves in their treaties to be
under the protection of the United States; they admit that the United States shall have the
sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with them, and managing all their affairs
as they think proper.22
From this, we can see that, in the Supreme Court’s opinion, the Cherokee and other
Indian nations were regarded as residing within the territorial limits of the United States. Their
external sovereignty had been lost because they could no longer trade or enter into other relations
with foreign nations, as those matters were governed by the United States. Marshal C.J.
confirmed this loss of external sovereignty by stating that “[t]hey and their country are
considered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so completely under the
sovereignty and dominion of the United States that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form
a political connexion with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of our territory and an
act of hostility.”23 Consequently, the Indian nations, although states in the sense that they have
retained political authority, are not foreign states, but rather “domestic dependent nations.”24
Marshall C.J. found further support for this conclusion in article I, section 8(3), of the
Constitution, which provides Congress with the power to “regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.” By designating the Indian
tribes separately from foreign nations in this clause, the Constitutional Convention cannot, in his
opinion, have meant to include them in the meaning of “foreign States” in article III, section
2(1), when describing the jurisdiction of the courts. 25 As a result, the motion for an injunction
was denied because the Court lacked jurisdiction under the Constitution to decide the case.
The third Indian rights case decided by the Marshall Court, Worcester v. Georgia,26 also
involved the Cherokee Nation. It resulted from the prosecution and conviction by the State of
Georgia of an American missionary, Samuel Worcester of Vermont, for violating Georgia law by
residing in Cherokee territory without a licence from the State. He appealed his conviction and
sentence of four years of hard labour in a State penitentiary to the Supreme Court, which clearly
had jurisdiction over this case. Worcester argued, among other things, that the law of Georgia
20

Indians generally were only made US citizens in 1924 by an Act of Congress: A bill granting citizenship to
Indians, and for other purposes, Act of June 2, 1924, 43 Stat. 253. Thereafter, those who are enrolled members of
Indian nations have dual citizenship. See Nell Jessup Newton et al., eds., Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law
2012 Edition (Newark NJ: LexisNexis, 2012), §14.01.
21
Cherokee Nation, supra note 15 at 17.
22
Ibid. at 17.
23
Ibid. at 17-18.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid. at 18-20.
26
6 Pet. (31 U.S.) 513 (1832).
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under which he had been charged was unconstitutional because it was repugnant to treaties
between the United States and the Cherokee Nation, by which the United States had
acknowledged that the Cherokee are a sovereign nation with authority to govern themselves and
everyone residing in their territory, free of any interference by State legislatures. The Supreme
Court agreed and overturned the conviction.
In several key passages, Marshall C.J. provided further understanding of the status of the
Indian nations and their relationship with the United States. He started with the factual
observation that “America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct
people, divided into separate nations, independent of each other and of the rest of the world,
having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their own laws.”27 He affirmed
the doctrine of discovery he had adopted in Johnson v. M’Intosh, but modified it by limiting it to
regulation of the rights among the European nations who had agreed to it – it could not affect the
rights of the Indian nations who were in already in possession and who had not agreed to it.28
Referring to the pre-American Revolution colonial period, he said:
Certain it is, that our history furnishes no example, from the first settlement of our
country, of any attempt on the part of the crown to interfere with the internal affairs of the
Indians, farther than to keep out the agents of foreign powers, who, as traders or
otherwise, might seduce them into foreign alliances. The King … purchased their
alliance and dependence by subsidies; but never intruded into the interior of their affairs,
or interfered with their self government, so far as respected themselves only. 29
Thus, while Britain asserted its sovereignty over the Indian nations insofar as their external
relations were concerned, it respected their internal sovereignty. Likewise, when the “United
States succeeded to all the claims of Great Britain, both territorial and political”, it made no
attempt “to enlarge them.”30 The American government continued to respect both the internal
sovereignty and the land rights of the Indian nations:
From the commencement of our government, congress has passed acts to regulate trade
and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and
manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts
… manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities,
having territorial boundaries within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right
to all the lands within those, which is not only acknowledged, but guarantied, by the
United States.31
In a passage summing up the status of the Indian nations, Marshall C.J. concluded:
27

Ibid. at 542-43.
Ibid. at 544. In the international law upon which Marshall C.J. relied, agreements are binding only on the parties:
see Clipperton Island Case (1932), 26 A.J.I.L. 390 at 394; Lord [Arnold Duncan] McNair, The Law of Treaties
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 309-21; Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 7thth ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2014), 672-74.
29
Worcester v. Georgia, supra 26 at 547.
30
Ibid. at 544.
31
Ibid. at 556-57.
28
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The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the
soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible
power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the
first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a restriction
which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians. The
very term “nation,” so generally applied to them, means “a people distinct from others.”
… The words “treaty” and “nation” are words of our own language, selected in our
diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well
understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to the
other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense. 32
Consequently, the laws of Georgia could not apply in Cherokee territory, as that would violate
the treaty relationship between the Cherokee and the United States and impinge on the political
authority of the Cherokee nation. Under the Constitution and laws of the United States, relations
with the Cherokee are entirely under the jurisdiction of the federal government.33
The internal sovereignty of the Indian nations has been reaffirmed by the US Supreme
Court on numerous occasions.34 As we have seen from Marshall C.J.’s judgments, American
acknowledgement of this internal sovereignty was simply a continuation of the earlier policy of
the British Crown. So during the very period when the Westphalian conception of absolute
sovereignty came to dominate European political thought and international law, a different
concept of shared sovereignty was being applied in North America. This concept continued
under the federal system created by the US Constitution, which may have drawn inspiration from
the Constitution of the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) Confederacy.35 So in the United States,
sovereignty is shared internally by the federal government, the Indian nations, and the States.
However, the Supreme Court has subjected the internal sovereignty of the Indian nations to a
severe limitation – it is subject to the plenary power of Congress and so can be restricted and
even terminated at any time.36 As we shall see, the Canadian Parliament had the same power up
32

Ibid. at 559-60.
Ibid. at 561.
34
E.g., see Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 at 560-62 (1883); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 at 557
(1975); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 at 322-24
(1978); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 at 204-05 (2004) [Lara].
35
Whether the Haudenosaunee example influenced the Founding Fathers is a matter of debate: e.g., compare Donald
A. Grinde Jr. & Bruce E. Johansen Exemplar of Liberty: Native America and the Evolution of Democracy (Los
Angeles: American Indian Studies Center, University of California, 1991), with Philip A. Levy, “Exemplars of
Taking Liberties: The Iroquois Influence Thesis and the Problem of Evidence” (1996) 53:3 William & Mary Q. 588,
and Samuel B. Payne Jr., “The Iroquois League, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution”, ibid., 605. See
Grinde & Johansen’s response, “Sauce for the Goose: Demand and Definitions for ‘Proof’ Regarding the Iroquois
and Democracy”, ibid., 621.
36
E.g., see United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Tee-HitTon Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955); Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 at
192 (1989); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 at 343 (1998). For confirmation of the plenary
power doctrine in the 21st century, see Lara, supra note 34. For criticism, see Philip P. Frickey, “Domesticating
Federal Indian Law” (1996) 81 Minn. L. Rev. 31; Robert N. Clinton, “There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for
Indian Tribes” (2002) 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 113; Robert A. Williams, Jr., Like a Loaded Weapon: The Rehnquist Court,
33
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until 1982, when it was removed by recognition of Aboriginal and treaty rights in the
Constitution.
2. Canada
Although Canada, like the United States, is a federal state, the concept of shared sovereignty
somehow got lost in the transition from British colonies to independent nation-state. Perhaps
this was due to the concept of a unified Crown in which complete sovereignty is thought to be
vested – the federal and provincial governments act on its behalf but, in theory, the Crown is a
single legal entity that F.W. Maitland described as “a corporation sole.”37 Despite the unreality
of this concept in a nation where the federal and provincial governments enter into contracts and
sue one another in court, it has remained remarkably tenacious.38
Nonetheless, the notion of a single sovereign in Canada from which all governmental
authority is derived is inconsistent with our history. From the outset of colonization, the French
and British entered into treaties with the Indigenous peoples that acknowledged their political
authority, a process that continued up to the 1920s, was renewed in the 1970s, and continues to
this day.39 Although France and Britain claimed sovereignty vis-à-vis other European nations
over the territory now known as Canada, they realized that their relations with the Indigenous
nations were a separate matter, governed in part by Indigenous laws and protocols.40 In 1664,
the British entered into the Two-Row-Wampum (Kaswehntha or Guswhenta) Treaty with the
Haudenosaunee at Albany, by which they agreed to respect each other’s independence. 41 In
1701, France negotiated a treaty of peace and alliance with forty sovereign Indigenous nations,
an event that historian Gilles Havard describes as “a triumph for Amerindian diplomatic
customs.”42 In 1764, after the British Crown acquired New France and issued the Royal
Proclamation of 1763, Sir William Johnson, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the
Britain’s northern district, met with numerous Indigenous nations at Niagara, where he read the
Proclamation and negotiated a treaty that respected their protocols and, among other things,
Indian Rights, and the Legal History of Racism in America (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 7183. On termination, see Donald L. Fixico, Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945-1960
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986).
37
F.W. Maitland, “The Crown as Corporation Sole” (1901) 17 L.Q.R. 131.
38
For recent affirmation of the unity of the Crown, see Grassy Narrows First Nation v. Ontario (Natural
Resources), [2014] 2 S.C.R. 447. For criticism, see Kent McNeil, “The Obsolete Theory of Crown Unity in Canada
and Its Relevance to Indigenous Claims” (2015) 20 Rev. of Const’l Stud. 1.
39
See James (Sa’ke’j) Youngblood Henderson, Treaty Rights in the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: Thomson
Carswell, 2007); Joshua Ben David Nichols, “A Narrowing Field of View: An Investigation into the Relationship
Between the Principles of Treaty Interpretation and the Conceptual Framework of Canadian Federalism” (2019)
56:2 Osgoode Hall L.J. 350-95. Canada inaugurated the modern treaty process in 1973 by creating the
comprehensive land claims policy after the Supreme Court’s decision in Calder v. Attorney-General of British
Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313.
40
In addition to the sources cited supra in notes 6 and 7, see Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples, vol. 1, Looking Forward, Looking Back (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1996), 99-136; Aimée
Craft, Breathing Life into the Stone Fort Treaty: An Anishinabe Understanding of Treaty One (Saskatoon: Purich
Publishing, 2013), especially 31-36, 66-83.
41
See Henderson, supra note 39 at 158-61.
42
Gilles Havard, The Great Peace of Montreal of 1701: French-Native Diplomacy in the Seventeenth Century,
translated by Phyllis Aronoff & Howard Scott (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 182.
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“gave treaty recognition to the nation-to-nation relationship between the First Nations and the
British Crown.”43
In 1990 in R. v. Sioui,44 the Supreme Court of Canada likewise acknowledged the
independence of the Indigenous nations in what is now Eastern Canada during the colonial
period when France and Britain claimed sovereignty vis-à-vis Europeans. For a unanimous
Court, Justice Lamer (as he then was) said:
The mother countries did everything in their power to secure the alliance of each Indian
nation and to encourage nations allied with the enemy to change sides. When these
efforts met with success, they were incorporated in treaties of alliance or neutrality. This
clearly indicates that the Indian nations were regarded in their relations with the
European nations which occupied North America as independent nations. The papers of
Sir William Johnson (The Papers of Sir William Johnson, 14 vol.), who was in charge of
Indian affairs in British North America, demonstrate the recognition by Great Britain that
nation-to-nation relations had to be conducted with the North American Indians. 45
Lamer J. then quoted with approval a passage from in Worcester v. Georgia where the Chief
Justice Marshall had said: “Such was the policy of Great Britain towards the Indian nations
inhabiting the territory from which she excluded all other Europeans; such her claims, and such
her practical exposition of the charters she had granted: she considered them as nations capable
of maintaining the relations of peace and war; of governing themselves, under her protection;
and she made treaties with them, the obligation of which she acknowledged.”46 So although
Britain excluded other European nations from the territories it claimed, it still considered the
Indigenous peoples inhabiting these territories as nations that governed themselves. Moreover,
when Britain accepted the French Capitulation of Montreal in 1760, that “was fundamentally an
agreement between the French and the British which in no way prevented independent
agreements between the British and the Indian nations, whether allies of the French or of the
British, being concluded or continuing to exist.”47 In other words, treaties with France only
governed relations with that nation. “It would be contrary to the general principles of law,”
Lamer J. said, “for an agreement concluded between the English and the French to extinguish a
treaty concluded between the English and the Hurons.”48 Treaties with the Indigenous nations
thus operated in a separate realm – they created nation-to-nation relationships that were not
affected by diplomatic dealings between European nations.
Remarkably, one week after deciding R. v. Sioui, the Supreme Court delivered its
unanimous judgment in R. v. Sparrow, in which it declared that “there was from the outset never

43

Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney General), 51 O.R. (3d) 641 at para. 56. See John Borrows,
“Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History, and Self-Government”, in Asch,
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights, supra note 6 at 155.
44
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025.
45
Ibid. at 1053.
46
Ibid. at 1054, quoting Worcester v. Georgia, supra note 26 at 548-49 (Lamer J.’s emphasis).
47
R. v. Sioui, supra note 44 at 1063.
48
Ibid.
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any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power … vested in the Crown”.49 The Sparrow case
involved the fishing rights of the Musqueam in British Columbia, where relations between the
Indigenous peoples and the British were different from Eastern Canada. British sovereignty was
asserted much later in British Columbia and treaties were not negotiated there, apart from the
fourteen Douglas Treaties in the 1850s, involving small areas of Vancouver Island, and Treaty 8
in 1899, extending into the northeast of the province. Another difference was that the
Indigenous peoples in what is now British Columbia were each smaller in population and more
isolated geographically from one another than the Mi’kmaq, Haudenosaunee, Huron,
Anishinaabe, and other eastern Indigenous peoples, so they did not pose a military threat to the
British, either on their own or as allies of France, Britain’s colonial rival in the East. The British
apparently thought they could simply assert sovereignty over the Indigenous peoples west of the
Rocky Mountains, and only entered into treaties with a few of them on Vancouver Island to
acquire lands for settlement. The Supreme Court apparently agreed, given the statement in
Sparrow that the Crown acquired sovereignty “at the outset” (which we now know was in 1846
when a bilateral treaty with the United States “conclusively established” British sovereignty 50),
even over the territories of the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en, far to the north of the international
boundary along 49th parallel in a region where the British were certainly not in effective
occupation or control at the time.
How could Britain have acquired sovereignty over all of British Columbia in 1846 when
its occupation and control was limited to small areas around isolated trading posts (e.g. Fort
Langley and Fort Victoria) operated by the Hudson’s Bay Company, posts that were few and far
between and located mainly in the southern part of the territory? 51 Britain obviously did not
have de facto sovereignty over the rest of the province, as that would have required effective
control and the exercise of government functions. Its assertion of sovereignty was at best
notional – it operated only at some abstract level and would not even have provided Britain with
de jure sovereignty in the international law of the time. 52
More recently, the Supreme Court has begun to exhibit some discomfort with the notion
that the Crown could acquire sovereignty by mere assertion, confirmed by a treaty with the
United States. In two decisions released simultaneously in 2004, Haida Nation v. British
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Columbia (Minister of Forests)53 and Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia
(Project Assessment Director),54 the Court, for the first time, acknowledged “pre-existing
Aboriginal sovereignty”, referred to Crown sovereignty as “de facto”, and said that the promise
of rights recognition in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 “is realized and sovereignty
claims reconciled through the process of honourable negotiation.”55 But if the Indigenous
nations of British Columbia were sovereign prior to Britain’s assertion of sovereignty in 1846, 56
how could the Crown have acquired sovereignty over them and their territories without conquest
and without treaties with them that recognized Crown sovereignty?57 A possible international
law answer is prescription, which involves the peaceful exercise of de facto sovereignty for a
sufficiently long time, but apparently de jure sovereignty could only be acquired by prescription
if the prior sovereigns acquiesced, which the Indigenous nations have not. Moreover,
prescription could not have applied in 1846 because the Crown’s exercise of sovereignty did not
even commence over most of the province until many years later.58
It is thus apparent that the Supreme Court has created quite a muddle for itself by
acknowledging pre-existing Indigenous sovereignty while continuing to accept 1846 as the time
of Crown assertion of sovereignty in British Columbia.59 A more accurate understanding of the
legal history would be to accept that the Oregon Boundary Treaty of 1846 only settled the
territorial claims of Britain and the United States in relation to one another. Given that the
Indigenous nations were sovereign, that bilateral treaty could not have affected their territorial
rights because they were not parties to it. 60 Crown sovereignty over British Columbia was not
acquired by that treaty; instead, the Crown gradually extended its sovereignty by exercising de
facto jurisdiction and control over the province. The Supreme Court acknowledged in Haida
Nation and Taku River that the Crown’s sovereignty is de facto. However, due to the act of state
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doctrine, the courts do not have the authority to question Crown sovereignty. 61 They are obliged
to accept its reality but lack jurisdiction to rule on its legality. Nonetheless, as we have seen, the
Court in Haida Nation seems to have realized that Crown sovereignty would not be legitimate
until it is reconciled with pre-existing Indigenous sovereignty through honourable negotiations
leading to treaties.62
What, then, is the situation prior to the negotiation of treaties that reconcile sovereignties,
which is still the situation in most of British Columbia? It cannot be that the Westphalian model
of sovereignty applies to give the Crown complete sovereignty, as that would be inconsistent
with historical reality and fundamental principles of justice and self-determination of peoples.63
In 1846, we have seen that Britain occupied only tiny bits of the province (Hudson’s Bay
Company posts) and exercised no jurisdiction whatsoever over the Indigenous peoples.
Consequently, Indigenous law and governmental authority must have continued unabated – there
was simply no other law and authority in place. In other words, Indigenous sovereignty was
maintained, alongside Crown sovereignty that was limited to miniscule areas. Over the second
half of the 19th century, the Crown gradually extended its jurisdiction over most of province,
acquiring de facto sovereignty, as the Supreme Court recognized in Haida Nation and Taku
River. But this does not mean Indigenous sovereignty was entirely displaced.64 Despite
infringements on their sovereignty by the application of provincial and federal laws, such as
hunting and fishing laws and the Indian Act,65 Indigenous nations continued to govern
themselves and follow their own laws, albeit clandestinely in many cases. 66 In Campbell v.
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British Columbia,67 Justice Williamson decided that the Indigenous peoples’ inherent right to
govern themselves has continued and not been extinguished.68
So as both a practical and a legal matter, the Indigenous nations must have retained some
of their sovereignty. As a result of Crown acquisition of sovereignty, they have no doubt lost
their authority to engage in relations with foreign states – given that the international community
acknowledges Crown sovereignty over Canada, Indigenous sovereignty is internal rather than
external. How, then, is sovereignty shared internally? Federal and provincial powers are listed
in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.69 But as decided by Williamson J. in
Campbell, that Act did not exhaustively distribute governmental powers. 70 The pre-existing
governmental authority of the Indigenous peoples continued and was recognized and affirmed by
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.71 Unlike sections 91 and 92, that section does not
enumerate the powers of Indigenous governments; instead, it provides constitutional space and
protection for the inherent governmental authority that Indigenous nations have as a result of
their pre-colonization sovereignty. As Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged in Johnson v.
M’Intosh and Worcester v. Georgia, prior to European colonization that authority was complete
because the Indigenous nations were sovereign. European assertions of sovereignty and the
incorporation of the Indigenous peoples into the United States diminished their sovereignty so
they could no longer interact with foreign states, but it did not take away their internal
sovereignty. Likewise in Canada, the inherent right of the Indigenous peoples to govern
themselves, while limited by the concept of sovereign incompatibility, 72 has continued to this
day.
However, because the Crown has sovereignty, Parliament and the provincial legislatures
also have governmental authority over Indigenous territories. Their authority, as defined by
sections 91 and 92, is concurrent with Indigenous governmental authority, so federal and
provincial laws can apply in Indigenous territories, in the absence of conflict with Indigenous
laws. In the event of conflict, Indigenous laws should prevail because Indigenous sovereignty is
protected by section 35. For federal or provincial laws to prevail over Indigenous laws, the
Crown would have to prove that, in the circumstances, this is a justifiable infringement in
accordance with the test established by the Supreme Court in Sparrow, which requires proof of a
[2000] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 (B.C.S.C.) [Campbell]. In House of Sga’nisim v. Canada (Attorney General), [2012] 2
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deciding the inherent right issue: [2013] 2 C.N.L.R. 226 (B.C.C.A.).
68
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Gwitchin First Nation, 2020 YKSC 22.
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valid legislative objective and respect for the Crown’s fiduciary obligations towards the
Indigenous peoples.73
Section 35 has resulted in a major shift in Canadian constitutional law. Prior to its
enactment, Parliament enjoyed complete legislative authority over Indigenous peoples and their
rights,74 equivalent to the plenary power of Congress in the United States. Since 1982, the rights
recognized and affirmed by that section can no longer be extinguished unilaterally, even by
Parliament,75 and infringement requires justification, which the Crown, as far as I know, has only
been able to succeed in proving in one instance.76 The shared sovereignty that pre-dated section
35 has thus been constitutionalized, providing the Indigenous peoples with substantial protection
for their governmental authority.77
3. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
The UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (Declaration) on September 13, 2007.78 Although the United States and Canada initially
voted against the Declaration, in 2010 President Obama announced that the United States would
support it, and Canada in the same year provided weak acceptance. The Trudeau government
went further in 2016 by endorsing it without qualification and promising to implement it.
Several articles in the Declaration are relevant to our discussion because they appear to
endorse the concept of shared sovereignty. Article 3 states that “Indigenous peoples have the
right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” The right to “freely determine
their political status” must mean that they have the right to govern themselves. This is explicitly
confirmed in article 4: “Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have
the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as
well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.” Article 5 provides in part
that “Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal,
economic, social and cultural institutions” (this is repeated in article 20, with slightly different
wording, with “develop” in place of “strengthen”). This implies that, if the authority of their
political institutions has been restricted, their right to self-determination includes the right to reFor further discussion, see Kent McNeil, “The Jurisdiction of Inherent Right Aboriginal Governments” (West
Vancouver: National Centre for First Nations Governance, 2007), online: Osgoode Digital Commons and
<http://fngovernance.org/ncfng_research/kent_mcneil.pdf>.
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assert their governance authority. Article 18 states: “Indigenous peoples have the right to
participate in decision-making in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives
chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and
develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions.” These representative institutions
are obviously governmental in nature, as they have authority to participate in decision-making in
relation to rights. Article 33(2) provides that “Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the
structures and to select the membership of their institutions in accordance with their own
procedures.” “Institutions” in this article must include “political institutions” in accordance with
articles 5 and 20 (above). Article 34 acknowledges the right of Indigenous peoples “to promote,
develop and maintain their … judicial systems and customs”, thereby recognizing that they have
governance authority in relation to enforcing their own laws.79 Article 37(1) provides that
“Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties,
agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to
have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.”
As we have seen, early treaties in what are now the United States and Canada acknowledged
Indigenous sovereignty and created nation-to-nation relationships. Articles 41 and 42 impose
obligations on the United Nations to contribute to the realization of the Declaration’s provisions
and to promote respect for the rights contained therein.
Taken as a whole, the Declaration’s provisions provide strong acknowledgment of the
right of Indigenous peoples to govern themselves, but only within the confines of the state that
encompasses them. This is made clear at the end of the Declaration in article 46, which provides
in part: “Nothing in this Declaration may be … construed as authorizing or encouraging any
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent States.”
The Declaration is consistent with the American concept of shared sovereignty (though
probably not with the plenary power of Congress) that has been accepted by the Supreme Court
ever since Chief Justice Marshall’s decisions in the 1820s and ’30s. Justifiable infringement
aside,80 it is also consistent with the interpretation of Canadian constitutional law presented in
this paper. The Declaration thus provides international confirmation of the continuing internal
sovereignty of the Indigenous peoples in North America.
4. Conclusion
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The concept of absolute state sovereignty is gradually being eroded as Indigenous nations in
North America challenge its imposition on them and demand acknowledgement of their
sovereignty. However, with rare exceptions – the Haudenosaunee Confederacy is one – they are
not asserting their independence from the United States or Canada. Instead, they are generally
willing to share sovereignty with the governments of these states.
Although the United States Supreme Court acknowledged internal Indigenous
sovereignty early on, the Court’s later invention of congressional plenary power over the Indian
nations has diminished Indigenous sovereignty by making it vulnerable to the legislative will of
Congress. Fortunately, Canada moved away from parliamentary supremacy over the Indigenous
peoples when section 35 was included in the Constitution in 1982, though the justifiable
infringement doctrine does provide a way for legislatures to impinge on Indigenous sovereignty
in some situations. Nonetheless, shared sovereignty is now a constitutional reality in Canada.
The Westphalian model of complete state sovereignty has never applied in North
America, as is evident from the nation-to-nation relationships developed with the Indigenous
peoples by treaty and other dealings.81 The United Nations, by adopting the Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, has acknowledged that internal sovereignty has to be shared with
Indigenous peoples. The challenge now is to get states to take this concept of shared sovereignty
seriously and fully implement the Declaration.
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